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Shrinking or Changing? 
By Rupert Strachwitz 
1. The Issue 
“The last decade has witnessed contrasting developments. CSOs are now widely recognised 
as development actors in their own right. They have increased in number and respond to new 
social bases, building coalitions at all levels. CSOs stand out thanks to their capacity to reach 
out to, empower, represent, and defend vulnerable and socially excluded groups, and trigger 
social innovation. Against this backgrund, governments in several countries have strengthened 
their engagement with CSOs. Yet the relationship between states and CSOs is often delicate. 
A limited tradition of dialogue still prevails in many countries and far too often the space for 
civil society remains narrow or is shrinking, with severe restrictions applied”1. 
This analysis, originating in a governmental organisation, sums up well what has happened to 
the phenomenon of civil society over the past ten or fifteen years. The hopes that the lessons 
learnt from the late 1980s and early 1990s, the latter being hailed as the “decade of civil 
society”2, most particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, but also in South Africa and other 
regions have not been fulfilled. While on the one hand, in academia as in the field, the notion 
that collective action in society is exercised in three distinct arenas, has increasingly become 
commonplace, this has not meant that society would in fact develop in a manner which would 
involve these arenas operating on a level playing field and in respectful cooperation with each 
other. Over the last few years in particular, the world has seen growth, competition and an 
increasingly blurred rather than clear vision of which arena should be engaging in what. This 
has to do with the rise of the global market place as with that of transnational and 
intergovernmental governance, with the revolution of communication technology as with state 
and market failures, with an increasing focus on participatory democracy as with the sharp 
decline of trust in institutions in general, with the rise of populist and anti-elitist movements as 
with efforts to preserve traditional structures. 
It is time to examine what exactly this means for civil society, given that ‘a shrinking space’ has 
become a catch-word3 while others would contend that the space has actually grown beyond 
a tolerable dimension. Described as “foreign agents” or in other derogatory terms (Amnesty 
2016), their activities are classified as hindering rather than promoting the development of 
society, while on the other hand, a plethora of events in Tunis, Kairo, Istanbul, Teheran, Kiev, 
Paris, London, and more recently Warsaw and Budapest have shown the world that the people 
will not refrain from assembling on their own accord and voicing their opinions under special 
_________ 
1 European Commission 2012, p.3-4 
2 act alliance 2011, p.2 
3 Civicus 2015 
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circumstances, be they critical or affirmative. In this sense, the space of civil society has 
actually grown. 
This paper will attempt to put the development of civil society into focus, exemplifying it by 
some key cases. In order to do so, a few basic terms of reference need to be introduced. 
2. What is Civil Society? 
The term ‘civil society’ has been used in a number of different ways since the times of Aristotle. 
Since Adam Ferguson’s ‘Essay on the History of Civil Society’ (1767) it has been become part 
of the political philosophy of Europe and North America, with Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) 
providing the first comprehensive analysis of its relevance. Antonio Gramsci (1948) added a 
Marxist perspective. Yet, today’s common usage is different and is not undisputed among 
scholars. The mainstream definition describes civil society in analytical rather than normative 
terms as an arena comprising numerous actors with widely different aims, sizes, and 
governance models, but united by a few definitory elements including a voluntary urge, a self-
defined public benefit goal, a not-for-profit priority, independence from government, a non-
distribution clause regarding any profits made, and an autonomous governance system. While 
civil society activities commonly thrive in societies based on principles of human and civil rights, 
the rule of law, and democracy, none of these are preconditions to the development or 
existence of civil society. Indeed, as could be seen in Central and Eastern Europe pre 1989, 
civil society can at times be most powerful under adverse conditions. In relationship to other 
spheres of society, civil society may be supportive, or voice concern and protest or indeed be 
instrumental in creating subcultures. This division was described by Albert Hirschman (1970) 
as ‘loyal, exit, and voice’. Within civil society, two main groups of actors may be identified: (1) 
organized civil society, i.e. associations and foundations with a stable organisational form and 
governance structure, and (2) unorganized civil society, consisting of spontaneous gatherings 
and groups, which may or may not eventually adopt a more organized form. All these actors 
are active in one or several of seven types of activity4: 
• service provision 
• advocacy 
• self help 
• watch dog 
• intermediary 
• community building 
• policy shaping. 
The civil society arena, unlike the arenas of the state and the market, does not in itself provide 
any representative structures. Therefore, there can be no formally elected representatives of 
civil society as such. Agents, actors, and experts need to be fairly chosen by other participants 
_________ 
4 Strachwitz 2014, p.81 
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in any dialogue with civil society.  Finally, contrary to widespread belief, civil society does not 
aspire to be inherently “good” in a moral, ethical, or politically welcome sense. There exists 
what is commonly termed a “dark side of civil society”, and individual actors are not necessarily 
pleasing to others. In normative terms, categories such as a strict refutation of violence, respect 
for other views and opinions, adherence to human and civil rights, and a drive towards an open 
society are seen as suitable for judging civil society actors. The importance of these 
judgements should not be underestimated5. 
3. Civil Society and the State 
From the 16th to the 20th century, the state, and the nation state in particular, in theory and 
practice adopted an attitude of overall responsibility for the welfare of the people, legitimized 
by ‘the grace of God’, popular consent, or force. This eventually developed into an assumed 
supremacy in all matters public, as exemplified by Hegel who put the state above what he 
termed civil society to mean any other collective action, be it commercial or non-commercial 
(Keane 2006, 11). Totalitarian systems obviously enhanced this view to mean that an 
individual’s rights were a grace and favour offered by the state. The theory of civil society in a 
modern sense would certainly not agree to this, putting the individual first as the principal, and 
describing all collectivities, be they governmental, commercial or other, as agents accountable 
to the principal. Yet, even in democratic societies, in Europe with the exception of the 
Netherlands and Switzerland in particular, a top-down view of society prevailed well into the 
20th century, and longer than that if one were to analyze the mindset of most agents of the 
government system. Little wonder therefore that traditional state theory could only accept civil 
society in a service providing and possibly a community building role, and in subservience to 
the state. Since the 1990s however, the national state as a concept has come under pressure 
and subsequently lost power – to transnational and supranational organisations, to regional 
and local governmental entities, and to the business community. While in 1990, for example, 
(West) Germany was the only EU member state with a federal state structure and was 
habitually classified as never having achieved the ultimate goal of national statehood, today, 
Belgium, Italy, and Spain, as well as the United Kingdom have undergone substantial 
constitutional moves towards federalism, and even France has devolved state powers. While 
in 1990, “national” businesses could still be considered the norm, picking a friendly 
governmental constituency has become as commonplace with the growing community of 
global business players as has multinational ownership. Besides, civil society activities, 
considered a fairly marginal affair a generation ago (although some lessons might have been 
learned from protest movements in Korea, the US, and elsewhere), have reached a stage 
when the governments’ arm can effectively be twisted by protests in the streets, advocacy 
campaigns, and even big service providers’ lobbying efforts. Besides, the increasing lack of 
_________ 
5 Garton Ash 1990, p.147 
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trust in any kind of large institutions has created a substantial overall trust vacuum, which new 
players, including but by no means exclusively CSOs, have been eager to fill. Furthermore, 
certain recent events have enhanced the importance of civil society. In Germany, it was the 
2015 refugee crisis6.  
Still, governments today, while realizing that social change and development can only be 
achieved with and certainly not against civil society, have yet to develop a coherent policy 
based on this fundamental shift. Since this necessarily involves a more participatory 
governance model, they are reluctant to do so. While not wishing to loose more power than 
they can help it and clinging to the paraphernalia of power, they tend to “muddle through” in 
finding a new modus vivendi with other contributors to the public good. The national 
governments are the least interested in yielding power to civil society, while transnational 
bodies like the European Union, the Council of Europe, and even the United Nations appreciate 
the independent views presented by non-governmental bodies. At the same time, national 
governments are interested in cheap service delivery (due to the volunteers attracted 
predominantly by CSOs), while resenting CSOs questioning the supreme authority and 
wisdom of the state. Political regimes that lean towards authoritarian principles of government 
however provide solutions based on formally shrinking the space of civil society. Russia, China, 
and lately Hungary, Poland, and Turkey have become best known for measures aimed at 
curtailing civil society activities. At short term, these measures present grave problems to civil 
society organisations; however, whether they will succeed at effectively making civil society 
shrink in the long run, seems extremely doubtful, given the global revolution of communication 
and the development of a world-wide political theory of acceptance of spontaneous and 
organized civic engagement that prevails today, and that makes citizens from all walks of life 
and of all ages take to the streets when they feel this is needed7. It no longer seems feasible 
to control, let alone determine all collective activity top-down, even less to limit private initiative 
to business activities, even if the latter’s aims – making a profit – seem more easily to be seen 
through and controlled. “Third spaces are problematic in every time and space. … But where 
they can be found and sustained, such third spaces contain the chance that people … make 
the world a better place.”8. This view is here to stay. 
4. Civil Society and the Market 
Finally, it seems necessary to look at the relationship between civil society and the arena of 
the market, a sphere of public life the importance and sheer size of which has grown beyond 
all expectations since the failure of the state-run economies. Thinking and acting in terms of 
competitiveness in the market and customer relationships have since become paramount, 
_________ 
6 Becker et al. 2016 
7 Hessel 2010 
8 Van Til 2008, p.206 
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even with the state and in civil society. Few people, to give just one example, objected when 
government departments started calling citizens customers.  
Some civil society actors are at the same time important market actors. German Caritas 
employs approx. 500,000 staff, which makes it one of the largest non-governmental employers 
in Europe. Approx. 50% of all hospital beds are managed by CSOs in Germany, while more 
than 35% today are managed by for-profit companies, compared to less than 10% 25 years 
ago. Needless to say, they operate in direct competition with each other. On the other hand, 
CSOs enjoy tax exemption and have access to government subsidies that businesses do not. 
Supranational organisations charged with enforcing free market principles, the European 
Commission for one, are therefore constantly being lobbied by business associations to put an 
end to what they see as undue privileges and unfair competition. The backbone of organized 
civil society, the large social welfare organisations, have in many cases had to adapt to new 
rules by creating for-profit tax-paying subsidiaries or even abandoning certain services that 
could no longer be described as having been forced upon them due to market failure.  
The general public has traditionally viewed CSO market activities with some suspicion. It has 
been argued – and in some cases proven – that the CSO form is no more than a ruse to 
deliberately cash in on the advantages in financial, tax, and in marketing terms, accorded to 
registered and accepted CSOs. This constitutes a major change from a generation ago when 
social welfare and eductaional CSOs tended to be seen as “somehow part of government”. 
The scandals, and most particularly the disclosure of salaries and fringe benefits earned 
surrounding the international sports world – FIFA, the IOC etc. – have naturally made people 
even more suspicious, not to speak of cases of outright corruption. And admittedly, civil society 
is not beyond criticism in terms of transparency, accountability and a strict separation from for-
profit activities. Yet, in terms of size, numbers, turnover etc. civil society has undoubtedly 
undergone a 30-odd year period of substantial growth. 
This, combined with an alleged, and again in some cases justified, lack of professional 
efficiency, has thrown traditional areas of civil society activities open to market competition. 
Services like ambulances is one area; more importantly, international aid today is rapidly 
moving towards a commercial market, in the hands of international corporations, readily 
accepted by governmental aid organisations as flexible, knowledgeable, and experienced 
partners9. Even educational and research institutions are quite regularly funded and operated 
by businesses, which makes the state and civil society seem at having lost out in an area that 
was theirs alone for centuries. 
Finally, since some years back, we can see a new movement emerging that aims at combining 
personal and public benefit aims. Social entrepreneurs, social businesses, and other kinds of 
_________ 
9 Economist 2016, p.47 
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business models are being developed that may well blur the traditional divide between for-
profit and not-for-profit. Young entrepreneurs who wish to do something worth while with their 
lives while remaining for-profit entrepreneurs and voluntarily waiving part of their real or 
potential profits, are competing with traditional CSOs that have moved steadily into a business 
mindset just short of distribution of profits, or have stayed behind in an administrative mode. 
Furthermore, movements such as convivialism10 are advocating a new way of conducting 
business that comes very close to and may well overtake established NGOs in their attitude 
on how to balance their books.  
To sum up, it may well be that civil society, while expanding beyond all expectations in the 
1990s, due to state and market failure, did not foresee the implications this rise in scope, 
potential, and power would entail, including reactions on the part of other societal actors who 
feel they are being unfairly crowded out of an increasing, potentially power-ridden and 
potentially profitable scope of activities. A devastating lack of critical research and a reluctance 
of CSOs to face the changes around them and reflect on their changed position has given both 
the state and the market the urge and possibly the chance to recuperate and drive civil society 
back into the margins. Some large CSOs do now see the signs on the wall and are discussing 
how to move away from the other arenas, but while this is happening, the space for civil society 
is certainly changing. 
  
_________ 
10 Les Convivialistes 2014 
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The Changing Social Fabric 
By Mareike Alscher, Eckhard Priller 
1. Introduction 
Current evolutions regarding the scope of civil society should be referred to as “Changing 
space” although the term „Shrinking Space“ has become quite common by now.  But the 
diagnosis of a “Shrinking Space” fails to consider the complete picture by concentrating mainly 
on legal changes, and thus perceiving civil society as a plaything at the hands of the state. 
This perspective neglects the autonomy of civil society as an independent and distinct sphere 
of society. Too little attention is paid to the fact that additional framework conditions also have 
a substantial influence on the structure of civil society. Taking a closer look at the intrinsic 
conditions of civil society should allow us to substantiate the assertion that one should refer to 
a “Changing -” rather than to a “Shrinking space” for civil society. 
2. Influential factors on Civil Society 
In a first step, we must consider the various influential factors that bring about change in civil 
society. In his report, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, UN High-Commissioner for Human Rights 
recently identified five key-elements for creating and sustaining a favourable environment for 
civil society11: 
• A robust legal framework that is in accordance with international standards and allows 
an effective access to justice 
• A favourable political climate 
• Access to information 
• Opportunity for participation in decision making processes 
• Long-term support through adequate resources 
This enumeration is clearly tailored to reflect the specific needs of human rights organisations 
and is thus incomplete. Two general factors that have not made it onto the list are demographic 
change and social inequality. Since the influence these factors exert vary widely depending on 
the country or region, the following statements will specifically concentrate on Germany as an 
example. 
3. Demographic change 
Obviously, the impact of demographic change on civil society depends on the country taken 
into account. Countries with high migratory fluctuations, an increasingly ageing population or 
a low mortality rate face different challenges than those with little to no migration, a low average 
age and a short life expectancy. 
_________ 
11 Auswärtiges Amt (2016, S. 217) 
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In Germany, the current demographic change is linked to an increased material prosperity. To 
name a few aspects that characterize this development: 
• Life expectancy increases due to better nutrition, growing health consciousness and a 
well-developed system of health care provision.  
• Despite a discrete reversal of this trend in recent years, less and less children are born. 
In 2015 women gave birth to an average of 1.5 children. 
• The overall population is growing older. There are fewer younger and more older 
people. 
• Cities steadily gain inhabitants, whereas the density of the population drops 
continuously in rural areas. 
• New ways of living together are gaining importance; simultaneously more people are 
living alone. 
• As a peaceful and prosperous country, Germany attracts many migrants. The share of 
citizens from a migrant background is constantly growing. 
One of the most important impacts of the demographic change in Germany is the changing 
age structure of the country. Since 1972 the mortality has surpassed the birth rate which leads 
to a decreasing population. 
In 2050 there will be almost four million more pensioners than in 2014. At the same time, the 
working age population will have decreased by nearly seven million and the population in an 
educational period by 1,5 million.  
Furthermore, demographic change is characterized by a certain rural exodus, that in turn leads 
to a growth of population in urban centres. Particularly strong among young people in the 
Eastern federal states during the last 25 years, migration from rural areas to the cities has 
become a pan-German phenomenon that represents opportunities but also risks for German 
civil society. 
Demographic change affects society as a whole and has to be dealt with. Not all tasks we are 
facing in this context are entirely new. It appears that demographic change emphasizes 
existing problems and gives them a greater urgency. Argueably, civil society is well equipped 
to play a key role in solving them.  
4. A changing social fabric. Increasing social inequality 
In addition to demographic developments, changes in the social fabric, in particular an 
increasing social inequality play an important role in how civil society is evolving. Measuring 
the extent of social inequality allows conclusions as to the chance each citizen gets to shape 
his/her life the way he/she wants it, and to actively participate in decision making processes 
regarding society in general, as well as civil society. 
13 
Social inequality occurs when the provision of resources (level of education, income level) or 
the living conditions (housing condition, health, safety) are distributed in a way that chronically 
gives preferential treatment to one part of society and disadvantages the other.12 
The extent and the specific nature of social inequality can be evaluated based on both material 
and immaterial factors such as assets, income, education, social capital, social background 
and gender. 
As proven by research on civil society, participation and community involvement, these factors 
have a substantial impact on the prospects of civil society. In other words: socio-economically 
marginalized citizens have a lesser chance to actively participate in civil society than others. 
For a German context, it is understood that civil society organisations increasingly have 
mechanisms in place that lead to the selection and exclusion of certain population groups.  
This is due to the structure and function of civil society organisations that is based on 
articulation of interests, autonomy and sociability.  
Social inequality is by no means a German phenomenon, it is an international one. Despite the 
goal of equality of sorts that has become a cultural guiding principle among western nations, 
all data available point in the opposite direction. A clear majority of people live in countries in 
which the divide between richer and poorer parts of society keeps growing deeper. This is 
tightly linked with a proliferation of precarious jobs on the one hand and a continuous growth 
of material wealth on the other.  
In Germany, growing social inequality translates itself into the fact that the wealthiest ten per 
cent of the population own more than half of the net assets, as recently shown by the national 
report on poverty and wealth.13  
Internationally, this divide can also be identified regarding other crucial factors such as 
education and gender. The developing world in particular faces a serious backlog in terms of 
education that needs to be addressed. Since education often correlates with gender and 
income, women often do not have the same access to education and, even if educated, are 
not paid equally. However, this gender pay gap is tangible in Germany as well. On average, 
women earn 22% less than men. If their education and professional field is taken into account 
the difference is still up to 6%. This income-disparity is obviously due to gender. 
  
_________ 
12 Hradil, Stefan / Schiener, Jürgen (2005, S.27-46) 
13 Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2017) 
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5. Consequences for and expectations of civil society 
Civil society does not remain unaffected by demographic change and increasing social 
inequality. Up to now, German civil society has failed to adjust to demographic change and 
social inequality, due the fact that civil society organisations tend to act in the here-and-now. 
Due to their structures and operational mechanisms they are more oriented towards their 
members than towards the surrounding circumstances. Additionally, they cannot plan ahead 
due to often chronically precarious financial conditions. This overall situation prevents 
numerous organisations from concentrating on societal developments, which is not without 
consequences.  
I will now discuss some consequences and expectations for the German context in greater 
detail. 
A. Changes of the organisational landscape 
Due to demographic change and the changing social fabric the organisational landscape is 
bound to change. In Germany, a decreasing population density will in turn lead to a decreasing 
density of organisations. The number of organisations will most probably stop growing to the 
same extent as in the past, even decreasing numbers are to be expected. Newly established 
organisations will increasingly face difficulties with complying to the minimum number of 
members necessary. This in turn might start a trend towards small and individually organised 
groups, with changing structures and new forms of activity. How the current conditions will 
affect the organisation’s work and how a best possible organisational landscape should be 
structured given the current developments remains to be seen. 
B. Changes in participation  
In light of the outlined demographic and socio-economic developments, it is to be expected 
that the structure of civic commitment will continue to change.  
• Especially in the context of day-to-day organisational practice, complaints can be heard 
regarding the difficulties to find committed people. In a substantial survey we conducted 
in 2011/12, only 20% of the interviewed organisations stated that they did not have 
difficulties finding volunteers14. 68 % of the organisations were facing increasingly 
overaged members as well as a decreasing sense of community. Demographic change 
certainly will lead to a lack of younger volunteers and in turn to a growing number of 
elderly ones. Not only does the number of elderly volunteers grow, people in general 
have a longer life expectancy and thus are healthy and able to be active for a longer 
_________ 
14 Vgl. Priller et al. (2012) 
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time in their lives. Current migratory movements will result in an increasing number of 
volunteers with a migration background.  
• Moreover, research on participation and volunteering points towards the fact that a low 
level of education as well as unemployment hamper civic engagement. Data shows 
that increasing social inequality excludes socially marginalized people from the sphere 
of civil society. Questions need to be asked about the democratic nature of civil society 
organizations: if the above mentioned marginalizing mechanisms grow even less 
permissive this could entail a delegitimation of civil society structures. 
 
C. Changes of the financial situation 
Demographic changes will make themselves felt in the funding of civil society organisations. 
Less members lead to fewer financial resources. The amount of membership fees and 
member-related donations will drop, access to public funding will be limited due to increased 
competition and project funding will become more important. 
How to handle financial needs and how to tap into new sources of funding will become the 
predominant question for the future development of the civil society infrastructure. Looking for 
ways to better include socio-economically marginalised groups could be one solution to this 
fundamental problem. Of course, this would entail a significant effort and require the 
development of full-time structures. Organisations are already reacting to this need by 
intensifying their plea for major gifts. 
D. Changes in performance demand 
Overall, framework conditions for civil society organisations under the current demographic 
and socio-economic circumstances are not improving. Yet, the need for the services civil 
society provides is increasing continually. It is thus crucial that civil society starts adapting to 
the changing age-structure and the social and health-related aspects this change entails. For 
instance, civil society organisations will face an increased demand for counselling and 
assistance. On the organisational level, the decreasing density of the population will require 
more cooperation and collaboration on the local level. In this way, civil society could help 
securing livelihoods in the long-term. This is the challenge civil society must meet in the future. 
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The Logic of Development  
by Susanne Ratka 
1 Civil Society and individual responsibility 
The familiar phrase that there is nothing permanent except change is certainly a truism. The 
present generation has witnessed a number of radical changes in the world, most which 
nobody could have preconceived. Just a few examples from the world of politics: The USSR 
has fallen apart, the Berlin Wall has come down, Nelson Mandela was released from prison to 
be President of the former apartheid regime in South Africa, and a number of years later an 
African American statesman, Barak Obama, became President of the United States. In 
Germany, since 2005, a woman, Angela Merkel, has been Chancellor. However, in many 
countries today, difficult situations exist. Take the Heinrich Boell Foundation’s publication on 
the development and trends of democratization world-wide1 and even more Ben Hayes’s study 
on the ploys of FATF (Financial Action Task Force)2, published by Brot für die Welt! One might 
easily lose hope for a moment and think it may at this point in history be better to duck and 
cover. But sometimes it is good to take a small step back from our daily business, take a breath 
and look at the whole picture. 
When I was a child, civic education was part of the curriculum, and this is what was was taught: 
„The family is the nucleus of democracy.” In Germany as in many other countries this is no 
longer true today, since society has undergone substantial changes. I would therefore like to 
make a case that the emancipated individual is the nucleus of democracy. Never before have 
we been so well informed as we are today – or in a position to gain information. This goes for 
every single one of us. It is matched by an added responsibility. Better education and access 
to digital media (with all its negative side effects) render this development the same more less 
everywhere in the world. 
2. Shrinking spaces and growing resistance   
Effects of this have already be seen in many countries where spontaneous demonstrations 
and gatherings of citizens have led to more organized forms of protest. What has been termed 
the ‘colour revolutions’ are good examples for this: 
• the rose revolution in Georgia (2003), 
• the orange revolution in Ukraine (2004), 
• the cedar revolution in Lebanon (2005), 
• the tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005), 
• the saffron revolution in Myanmar (2007), 
• the jasmin revolution in Tunisia (2010/2011). 
_________ 
1Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Dossier: For Democracy,16.06.10. https://www.boell.de/en/dossier-democracy 
2Bread for The World, Ben Hayes; Study, Analysis 68, The impact of international counterterrorism  
 on civil society organizations, April 2017 
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Most of these protest movement have, as known, caused backlashes of the existing systems, 
and only history can tell if they really initiated change. 
Individuals with a vision have become active, and started organisations with friends and like-
minded people. Some of these have become very big NGOS. A few random examples: 
• Greenpeace was founded in Canada in 1971 by 12 citizens with a boat, to stop a U.S. 
nuclear arms test. Today Greenpeace has more than 3 million members worldwide. 
• Attac was founded in Paris in 1998, based on an idea of the journalist Ignazio Romanet. 
Today, there are 90,000 members, and Attac is active in 50 countries. 
• Foodwatch was founded in Berlin in 2002 by former Greenpeace executive director 
Thilo Bode. Today, Foodwatch has 35,000 members and donors. 
• Stop TTIP Quickly became an alliance of 500 small European organizations. 
• Mehr Demokratie was founded in 1988 by a handful of German Green Party politicians 
and other interested activists, and today has more than 10,000 members. 
• Umweltinstitut München was founded in 1986 directly after the Chernobyl catastrophe 
by some committed citizens and scientists in Munich, Germany. Today, it has approx. 
7,000 members. 
• Pulse of Europe, one of the most recent movements, was founded as a pro-European 
initiative by a married couple in Frankfurt in late 2016, and is active in 11 European 
countries today. 
This list is anything but comprehensive. In addition, ideas and movements like Degrowth, Deep 
Ecology and Convivialism are making their impact on our time. And more recently still, on 22nd 
April, 2017, a March for Science was an immediate and spontaneous reaction to the 
endangering conditions in Turkey, Hungary, the US and other countries. In 520 cities 
worldwide, hundreds of thousands of citizens, 40,000 in Washington D.C. alone, senior 
academics, students and many others protested on the streets together for academic freedom. 
Many of those who marched had done so for the last time in the late 1960s.  
On 6th May, 2017, thousands of Polish citizens followed the call of the opposition parties to 
participate in the ‘March for Freedom’ to protect democracy in their country. A few days later, 
on Victory Day, the main Russian national holiday, thousands of people took part in anti-
corruption rallies in Moscow and St. Petersburg, fully conscious of the fact that many would be 
arrested. What we are seeing here and elsewhere is that attempts to shrink democratic spaces 
will not remain unanswered. Citizens everywhere are resisting attempts to cut back their 
human and civil rights, even under endangering conditions. The ‘Zeitgeist’, the spirit of the age, 
cannot be put back into the bottle. 
Civil society has certainly evolved as a strong contributor to societal matters and 
developments. But more than the state and the market, it is in a constant state of flux, as new 
movements are born, grow, become established and eventually are integrated into 
mainstream. They may become established market players, or they may lose their purpose or 
their zeal and disappear. Some movements may become important, rise and inspire many 
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people, like the movement of intentional communities, related groups and ideas. Others may 
remain small and yet important or continue to act on the fringes of society. 
3. Intentional communities a promising movement 
A case study may help to understand the complexity and distinctive quality of civil society 
development: There is some evidence that, if given the option, many people would prefer a 
living situation less isolated than what most experience today. The human being seems to 
have a natural preference for living in community. One of many initiatives from this field may 
serve as the case study: 
For about 40 years now, a growing number of individuals, groups and families are dreaming 
of escaping what they increasingly see as consumerism and exploitation. For some, this has 
led to a next step by taking action to create an intentional community and found a cohousing 
project or ecovillage, an Intentional Community being defined as “a group of people who have 
chosen to live together with a common purpose, working cooperatively to create a lifestyle that 
reflects their shared values”.3 The concept of ecovillages is known since the late 1980s. In the 
U.S., the first utopian settlements were started by the hippy movement; in Germany, it all 
started with some initiatives loosely connected to the aftermath of the extra-parliamentary 
opposition and students’ movement of the late 1960s and 70s. Until some time ago, these 
intentional communities thought of themselves as counter-models to the cultural mainstream 
and abstracted themselves from society. Thus, they epitomized Albert Hirschman’s 
categorization of an ‘exit’ type organization as opposed to those he defined as ‘loyal’ or ‘voice’4. 
Today there is more willingness in these communities to open up to society as well as for 
society to interact with the communities, in a common effort to look for alternatives and 
solutions for some of the challenges of our time.5 All these places and projects can be seen as 
laboratories and experiments for a more livable, regenerative and humanly connected future. 
Ecovillages are not necessarily rural, some projects like the Los Angeles Ecovillage, Le Case 
in San Diego and Avalon in Detroit exist in an urban context. Nonetheless, these communities 
focus on environmental sustainability with solar energy, grey water systems, living roofs and 
composting sanitary systems. In Ghana, Senegal and India, there are examples of traditional 
villages evolving into sustainable ecovillages and thus enhancing the life of their residents with 
permaculture, reforestation programs, solar power plants and water management solutions. 
“The kind of change required by sustainability implicates each community, each household, 
each individual. Successful solutions to problems at this level of society will need to be rooted 
_________ 
3Fellowship for Intentional Community(USA), goes back to the year 1937, sees its mission in supporting and promoting the 
development of intentional communities and the evolution of cooperative culture,  
www.ic.org/the-fellowship-for-intentional-community/ 
4 Hirschman (1970) 
5Around 500 ecovillages worldwide are members of the Global Ecovillage Network (GEN), but there are perhaps more than 1000. 
In addition, there are movements like Sarvodaya in Indonesia with 1800 villages, more then 300+ transition towns and hundreds 
of green-focused cohousing communities.  
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in the cultural specificity of the town or region if the people are to be supportive of and involved 
in such change.”6 
The most important work these communities do is to develop new ways of communicating and 
taking decisions as a group. All of them had to learn that it is not enough to have good 
intentions and that structural differences are important. Tools like nonviolent communication, 
the talking stick, consensus decisions, sociocracy, and fora help develop more consciousness 
on the way to communal governance.  
The network provides many opportunities to exchange knowledge and experiences. E.g., in 
China, a network called the Sunshine Ecovillage Network (SEN) and GEN offered training 
programs to government representatives, as they had officially expressed an interest in 
exploring the potential transforming 70 of the most beautiful traditional villages in China. In 
Germany, village mayors from marginal, economically difficult regions have recently 
approached the national branch of GEN, to see how they could establish ecovillages, in order 
to bring young people and families to these regions. Thus, Hirschman’s ‘loyal’ has been added 
to the defining elements of the movement.  
Finally, GEN is politically active and has consultative status with ECOSOC7 since 2000, is 
represented at regular briefings at UN headquarters and participated in the Conference on 
Sustainable Development in Rio 2012. In Hirschman’s terminology, GEN has become a ‘voice’ 
organization. Ross Jackson, founder of the gaia trust8, reminds us: “It is at the grass roots level 
we must look if we are to expect revolutionary change to occur. the only real solutions always 
come from the bottom and work their way up. Fortunately, there is a small minority that has 
the right priorities, the right understanding, and the courage to act in opposition to the dominant 
culture. They are many and they are found in all walks of life and in all countries.”9 
The ecovillage and community movement may surely be termed one of the generators of social 
change in our world. It shares this mission with hundreds of thousands of large and small, old 
and new, mainstream and radical, established and struggling movements and organizations 
everywhere in the world. The number and impact of these is steadily growing, despite all efforts 
to hedge them in, suppress them or corrupt them. Given these examples, the space for civil 
society cannot be seen as shrinking, but indeed as changing as rapidly as the world itself, and 
indeed as importantly contributing to this change. 
  
_________ 
6UNESCO, Educating for a Sustainable Future: A Transdisciplinary Vision for Concerted Action (1997), par. 114 
7The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was established by the UN Charter in 1945 as one of the six main organs of the 
United Nations. 
8Gaia Trust is a Danish-based charitable association founded in 1987 on the initiative of Ross and Hildur Jackson, with the intention 
of supporting the transition to a sustainable and more spiritual future society through grants and proactive initiatives. Gaia Trust 
has always been self-funded. Gaia Trust’s strategy has always been two-pronged with yin and yang components. The yin 
component was to support the ecovillage movement through grants, while the yang component was to invest its capital in “green” 
startup companies that would complement the grants policy, creating jobs and promoting more sustainable businesses 
9Ross Jackson: A Global Civi l izat ion in Harmony (http:/ /gaia.org/gaia -trust/our-vis ion)  
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